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Abstract
Since  the early 1990s numerous countries have adopted  competition  law is insignificant.  However,  once
or strengthened  competition legislation.  Kee  and  alLowance is  made for the endogeneity  of both domestic
Hoekman  investigate the impact of competition  law on  competnton (number of firms)  and the adoption of a
industry markups  over time and across  a large number of  competition  law,  the authors find that competition  laws
countries. They find both domestic  and foreign  have an indirect effect on equilibrium  markups by
competition  to be major sources of market discipline  in  promoting a larger number of domestic firms.
concentrated  markets, but that the direct  effect of
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An important  focus  of discussions  in international  fora such as the WTO and the OECD is
whether and how to expand the reach  of competition legislation across members,  strengthen
cooperation  between  national  agencies  and  explore  the scope  for  the adoption  of common
norms.  For example,  multilateral dialogue in the WTO is currently focusing on an agreement
that members  abide by 'core principles'  - nondiscrimination,  national  treatment  and trans-
parency (due process) - as well as, possibly, provisions banning 'hard core' cartels  (Hoekman
and Mavroidis,  2003).
Relatively little cross-country  empirical work has been done to identify the effect of com-
petition  law  on  the contestability  of markets.  For  OECD  countries  this  is an  interesting
research  question,  but not of major policy  significance  given that competition  enforcement
is long established  in the main jurisdictions  (US,  EU,  Canada,  Japan).  For  these countries
the policy questions  revolve around  issues such as the appropriate  approach to dealing with
vertical restraints and merger control.  In many  developing countries,  however,  the question
is much more fundamental  and centers on determining  the maglitude of the net  benefit of
competition  law.  Adoption of such  mechanisms  is costly,  requiring the allocation of skilled
lawyers  and economists  that  are in  scarce  supply.  It  may well  be that a larger 'bang  for
the  buck' can be obtained  through less administratively  costly policy measures  to increase
competition  on markets.  Of course,  trade economists  have long argued that trade liberaliza-
tion is a powerful and administratively very simple way of enhancing competition (Bhagwati,
1968)."  Other economists have emphasized the importance  of removing government  created
4  It  is often  argued  that an open trade regime  is a  powerful instrument  to discipline  the behavior  of firms
which have  market  power.  The  empirical  literature investigating  the  impact of import  competition  on the
pricing behavior  of domestic  firms  has  concluded  that trade  liberalization  forces  firms to set prices  closer
to marginal costs.  That  is, there is a negative relationship  between  price-cost  margins  (markups)  and  the
openness  of the  economy.  Indeed,  Levinsohn  (1993),  Harrison  (1994),  Grether  (1996)  and Djankov  and
Hoekman  (2000)  all find some support  for the hypothesis that imports are  a source  of market discipline  in
2barriers  to entry and exit for firms  (Djankov et al,  2002).
This paper attempts to determine the relative impact of competition  law on competition
outcomes.  Specifically,  we investigate empirically the contribution of competition law relative
to alternative types of policies that enhance the contestability of markets, in particular import
competition  and measures  to ease entry  and exit  of firms.  FRom  a policy perspective  this
analysis  is relevant both in terms of informing decision makers on the relative importance of
alternative national  mechanisms to promote competition,  and in terms of identifying where
the priority areas for action may lie in terms of international cooperation.
We develop a simple model where the markup by an industry of price over marginal cost
is  positively related  to the  size of domestic  sales  and  negatively  related  to the  number  of
domestic  firms that are  active  in the  industry,  the magnitude  of imports  and the demand
elasticity of the industry.  Industry markups  are estimated as a semi-translog  function of the
number of firms, value of imports and domestic production, using country, year and industry
fixed  effects  to control  for  the demand elasticity  of the industries.  Having  determined  the
impact of foreign and domestic competition  (the number of domestic firms in an industry), a
dummy variable  approach is used to capture the impact of the introduction of a competition
law.
The results of cross-industry,  cross-country,  time series regressions  using a sample  of 28
industries, 42 countries and  18 years indicate that controlling for import competition  and the
number of firms in each industry/country, competition  law has no direct impact on industry
markups.  These results suggest that from a competition viewpoint, policy priority should be
given to measures that directly increase competition on markets - such as trade liberalization
or the removal of entry barriers.  However,  once we control for the endogeneity of competition
studies of domestic firns behavior in Turkey,  the Ivory Coast, Mexico, and Bulgaria respectively.  For reviews
of the literature,  see Levinsohn  (1996), Roberts and Tybout (1996)  and Evenett,  Lehmann,  and Steil (2000).
3law adoption,  we also find that industries that operate under a competition  law tend to have
a larger number  of domestic  firms,  suggesting  that in the long run,  competition  laws  may
have an indirect  effect on domestic industry markups by promoting entry.
This paper  is  organized  as  follows.  We discuss  our  empirical  model  in Section  2,  and
present  the data set  in Section  3.  Section  4  shows  the estimation  results,  and  Section  5
concludes the paper with some  policy discussions.
2.  Model
One of the biggest difficulties in studying the effectiveness  of competition law on industries is
to define a measurable outcome variable.  Given that the main objective  of any competition
law is to promote competition,  variables that capture the level of competition,  or the market
power of firms in the industries  are natural candidates.  One such variable is the markup of
price  over  marginal  cost  of production  by  firms in  an  industry.5 In perfect  competition,
price  equals  marginal  cost,  so that  the equilibrium  markup  equals  one.  When  firms  have
some market  power,  so that price  is greater than marginal  cost,  we  observe  markups that
are greater than  one in equilibrium.  Thus,  in principle,  the markup of price  over marginal
cost provide  a simple way to measure  the level  of competition.  However,  in practice,  given
that marginal cost is itself not a well measured variable,  the use of markups  as a measure of
competition  has been limited.
Hall  (1988)  developed  a simple way  to estimate industry  markup from  the production
function of firms.  Relaxing the neoclassical assumptions of perfect competition and constant
returns to scale,  Hall showed  that by estimating  the parameters  of a production  function,
we  can  interpret  the  coefficient  associated  with  the weighted  growth  rate  of  labor  as  the
FX  Other such variables include total revenue over total cost  (Roberts and Tybout,  1996) and entry threshold
(Bresnahan  and Reiss, 1991).
4implied  equilibrium  markup.  Based  on  his  model,  Levinsohn  (1993)  and  Harrison  (1994)
showed  that trade  liberalization  is associated  with  lower  industry markups  in Turkey  and
Cote D'Ivoire,  respectively.  Subsequent papers  by Norrbin (1993),  Roeger  (1995),  and Basu
and Fernald (1997) update Hall's approach to account for the usage of intermediate  input and
returns to scale.  To  address  endogeneity  issues of Hall regressions  which  are also common
across most  production  function  estimations,  Olley  and Pakes  (1996)  use  a polynomial  of
capital  and investment as a control for the unobserved  productivity.  They show that such  a
nonparametric correction  is successful  in reducing the upward bias  on the labor coefficient,
without  using instrumental variables that may be questionable.  This  is the approach  taken
by this paper.
In addition, we incorporate an industry markup function,  derived  from a short-run sym-
metric Cournot  equilibrium,  into  a Hall-type  regression in  this paper.  In a short-run  sym-
metric Cournot  equilibrium  (that  is,  not  allowing  for  entry),  industry markups  depend  on
the  number  of domestic  firms,  the share  of imports  in the domestic  market,  and the mag-
nitude  of total domestic  sales.  By introducing  the industry  markup function  into the Hall
regression directly,  we are  able to interpret the estimated  coefficients  associated  with the re-
sulting interaction terms between these variables and the weighted growth  rate of labor per
capital as the marginal  effects of these variables on industry markups.  In other words, we are
able to directly estimate the effects of domestic and foreign competition on industry markups
without explicitly estimating the industry markups themselves.  This allows us to avoid some
econometric  complications  arising from the use of an estimated  dependent  variable,  and at
the same time improve the efficiency  and degrees  of freedom  of the estimations.
In the empirical  model developed  below  the  role of competition  law is  twofold.  In the
short-run,  given a fixed number of domestic firms  and import penetration,  the introduction
5of  a competition  law  can  be regarded  as  a structural  change  in  the  economy  that  may
lower  industry markups directly by shifting down the industry markup  functions.  However,
in  the long-run,  when  firms  are  free to  enter  and  exit,  a competition  law  may affect  the
number  of domestic  firms by enhancing  the  contestability  of markets  through  facilitating
entry  (via  enforcement  of provisions  regarding  restrictive  business  practices,  the abuse  of
dominant  positions,  the  potential  for  creating  such dominance  through  mergers,  etc.).  It
is  important  to recognize that  countries  will  have different  incentives to adopt  competition
laws,  depending  on  the competition  environment  that  prevails  in their industries.  In the
long-run,  both the number  of firms and the adoption of competition law is endogenous.  This
is taken into account  in our estimations.
2.1  Hall Regression
For each country,  let the output  of industry i  in period t be characterized  by a production
function  of labor input,  L,t,  and capital input, Ktt,
Qit = A.tFi (Lt,  (1)
Differentiating  Equation  (1)  with  respect  to time and dividing  both sides by qt  yields the
growth rate version of Equation  (1):6
Q=  A,t  + aiLL%t + CeiKKit,  where  (2)
Lt  aFi nd  Kit  F3
F,t aL,t=  F tK  (3)
are the elasticity of output with respect to labor and capital inputs,  respectively.7
; Here  we  adopt the convention  to denote the growth rate of a variable with
-aInX,  1 ax6
6  xU &
6For each industry i, assume that the production function Fi is homogeneous  of degree  Si.
F, shows increasing, constant, or decreasing returns to scale with respect to all inputs when St
is greater than, equal to, or less than unity.  Subtracting  the growth rate of the capital input
from both sides  of Equation  (2)  and applying  Euler's theorem for homogeneous  functions,
we can  re-express Equation  (2)  as:8
qit = A,t +  Ck,Litt +  (Si - 1) K,t,  (5)
with the convention  that  x  =  X,  (i.e.,  small  caps  express  variables  in  per  unit of capital
terms).
Let
Pit =  C  X  (6)
be the price  over marginal  cost  markup  of industry i, and let  OttL  be the share of labor  in
total revenue.  Given that a%L = AitO.ttL, Equation  (5)  becomes
qit = Alt + J.t (0,JtLit)  + (S,  - 1) K,t  (7)
Equation (7)  can form the basis for estimation of industry markups by regressing the growth
rate  of value  added per  unit  of capital on the  weighted  growth  rate  of labor  per unit  of
capital and the growth rate of capital.9
As suggested by Basu and Fernald (1995),  one may be concerned regarding empirical  analyses that use the
growth rate of real value  added instead of the growth rate of real output,  given that due to the construction
of value-added statistics, the growth  rate of real value added will not be independent  of the growth rate of
intermediate  inputs if the market is not perfectly competitive  (even when production  functions  are weakly
separable).  However, the UNIDO industry level data set only provides real output for a few countries.  Thus,
due to data constraints,  we have to rely on real value added data rather than real output data.
8 According to Euler's theorem, if a production F, (L,t, Kit) is homogeneous of degree S, with respect to its
inputs,  then
Ct,L + Ct2K = Si  (4)
9 Note that while  maintaining the assumption that Cf,L  and atiK are parameters  of the production  function
of industry i that are constant  over time,  we allow industry markup, 1,L, and labor share, 
0 .tL to vary.  This
is consistent  with the empirical  data, as  we observe  some fluctuation  in OitL from  year to year.
7Complications  arise when  using Equation  (7)  due to the fact that productivity growth,
A,t,  is  unobservable.  It  is  crucial  to  control  for  A,t  since  it  enters  the firm's  first-order
conditions  for profit  maximization  that determine  both  input  demand  and  output  supply.
Not  controlling  for  A,t  will  bias  upward  the least  squares  estimates  for  the  coefficients  of
the  growth  rate  of labor  per unit  of capital  and  the  growth  rate  of capital  - a classical
endogeneity  problem.
Olley and Pakes (1996)  develop an empirical strategy to control for the endogeneity prob-
lem.  They introduce a polynomial of capital and investment as a control for the unobserved
productivity.  They  assume  that  at  the  beginning  of every  period,  firms  know  their  pro-
ductivity but  this  is  not observable  by the  researcher.  Based on  the  realized productivity,
firms decide to stay  in business  or to exit.  Providing that  all surviving firms  have positive
investment,  their investment  can  then be  used  as  a control  for productivity.' 0 In  other
words,  Olley  and  Pakes  assume  that  firms  with  higher  investment  are  those  that  realize
higher productivity  growth.  They show that by introducing a polynomial of investment  and
capital stock  as a control  for  productivity in the estimation of the production function,  the
upward bias  on the coefficient  of labor  input is reduced."  Given that  our analysis  centers
on industry markups  (that is, the coefficient  on labor input), getting consistent  estimates of
the labor coefficients  is critical.  We therefore  adopt the Olley and Pakes  correction  and use
a polynomial  of capital  and investment  to control  for the unobserved  industry  productivity
growth.
l(Levinsohn  and Petrin  (1999,  2000)  show that instead  of investment,  intermediate  input could be a good
instrument for productivity growth, especially  for those firms that stay in business but do not have positive
investment  every year.
"1Olley  and  Pakes  (1996)  also discuss bias  on the  capital coefficient  due  to entry  and exit  behavior of firms,
and use a selection  model to control  for it.
82.2  Markup Fumction
Leaving out time and industry subscripts for ease of exposition, assume that for each industry,
domestic  and  foreign  firms are  Cournot  players  in the domestic  market  for a homogenous
goods.  Given homogeneity we assume further that there  is a world market for the good  and
that imports can  be characterized  as being provided  by one importing foreign  firm,  with a
share  in the domestic market  of m.  There  are  N  identical  domestic firms.  Domestic  firms
face a positive fixed cost of entry, F, associated  with government imposed entry and/or exit
regulations  of the type documented  by Djankov et al (2002).  Taking the quantity produced
by other  firms, Q-,, as given, each  domestic  firm n chooses  its output  by maximizing  its
profits:
7r*  (N, F, m) -=max I  7rn (Qnt Q-n,) = P (Q) Qn,-  C (Qn,)-  F}, Vn =  ,,N,
where p(Q) is  the inverse  demand function,  Q =  QD + QM =ZZ  Qn +  QM,  QD iS  total
domestic  production  (sales),  and  QM  is  the  import  quantity.  (For  simplicity,  throughout
what  follows  we  assume that  domestic  firms  do not export,  so that domestic  production
equals  domestic  sales.  In  the empirical  analysis  below  we  take  into  account  exports  by
domestic  firms  in  the  calculation  of import  market  shares.)  The first  order  condition  for
profit  maximization implies:
p(Q)  [1_1  Q-]  (  (Qn)  ,(8)
where e--  (OQ/ap) (p/Q) > 0  is the price elasticity  of demand.
In a symmetric Cournot equilibrium, total domestic production is given by Q*, = N  Qn.
Rearranging Equation  (8)  according to the definition of the markup in Equation (6)  yields
1  (  Q-
EN  QD+QM~)
9Thus, the equilibrium markup in the domestic industry is inversely related to the magnitude
of imports and the number  of firms, while  it is positively related to size  of domestic produc-
tion."  In addition,  given the homogenous  good assumption,  the equilibrium  price set by
the domestic firms and the importer is identical,  which means that the quantity ratio equals
the volume ratio:
Q  P *QD  1
QD + Q  P*QD*  + P*Q  1T+  mI
where m =  PQf  denotes the ratio of imports to domestic  sales of the industry.  Thus, given
a fixed demand  elasticity,  industry  markups  are lower  when  there are more domestic  firms
and when the ratio of irnports to domestic sales  is larger:
11  (6,N,m)  =  11  1  (9)
c N  1+m
How  effective  are domestic and import  competition  in reducing  industry markup, given
the industry  demand  elasticity?  Figure  1 plots industry  markup  against  number  of firms,
given  a  hypothetical  demand  elasticity  of  2  and  an  import  ratio  of 0.3.  When  there  is
only  one domestic  firm, the industry markup  is about  1.6.  The markup falls  rapidly as the
number  of domestic firms increases, falling  below 1.1 once there are more than 5 firms in the
industry.  With 30 firms  or  more,  entry by  an additional  firm has only a negligible impact
on the industry markup.
Similarly, Figure  2 plots industry markup against the ratio of imports to domestic  sales,
given a hypothetical  demand elasticity of 2 and  10 firms in the industry.  We  again observe
that imports reduce  industry markups at a declining rate.  Moving  from zero imports to an
import  volume that equals  sales by domestic  firms,  markups drop  from 1.05  to 1.025.  The
markup  of the industry drops  below  1.1  once imports  are more than 4 times  the value  of
total domestic sales.
1 2See Jacquemin  (1982)  for a similar derivation.
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b'  i  '  5  j  4  *-Figure  3  plots industry markup  against  the ratio  of imports  to domestic  sales  and the
number  of domestic  firms,  given  a hypothetical  demand  elasticity  of  2.  Figure  3  clearly
mustrates  how import  competition  can  act  as a substitute for domestic  competition  when
there are a limited number  of domestic firms in the industry.
Figure 3:  Industry Markup vs.  Number  of Firms and Imports (E  =  2)
*1 
Markup\
Summing  up,  both  domestic  and  import  competition  have  larger  effects  on  industry
markup  when  the existing  industry  markup  is  higher,  as  can  be  expected  in  highliy  con-
centrated  markets.  If an  existing  industry  is  already  near  perfect  competition,  additional
domestic firms (entry)  or imports would have  only minimal impact  on markups.  These find-
ings are consistent  with those of Bresnahan  and Reiss  (1991),  where markets  are shown to
approximate  a competitive  one when there  are 5  or more firms.
12Equation  (9)  implies that  industry  markup  is  a non-linear  function  of the  number  of
domestic  firms  and the share  of imports  in domestic  sales.  We therefore  approximate  the
non-linear  relationship  with a second  order semi-translog  function:
i4C(N, m; Z)  =  0 + 1c +  1t +  ±i  + INN (ln Ntc)2 +3 Nln NitC
+13MM (In  mit.)2  +  3M ln  m,tc +I3 NM ln NitC In  mrtC + g(Z),  (10)
where the demand elasticity of industry i in period t of country c is assumed to be the sum of
country,  time  and industry fixed effects  and matrix Z  represents  a set of controls which may
help  reduce the bias of the estimated  coefficients.  Variables  in  Z include the total  value of
domestic output and labor cost in each  industry,  GDP and GDP per capita of the economy.
2.3  Short-Run Empirical Model
We incorporate the industry markup function into the Hall regression by substituting Equa-
tion (10)  into Equation (7):
qite  =  Cc+  C, + ct +  P5 (kttc, Iitc) +  [1 3+ 8  +  / 3 t +±+  i +fNN (ln  NitC)  +,AN  ln NtC
+OMM  (lnmitc)  +/Mlnm,tC  + /NMlnNitclnm,tc +g(Z)j  (OitLJt)  (11)
where  P5 (Kitc>I tc)  denotes  the 5th  order polynomial  of capital and  investment,  and  to-
gether with country-industry fixed effects and year fixed  effects, are the controls for industry
productivity  growth.
Equation  (11)  shows that the coefficients of the interaction terms between the arguments
of the semi-translog function and the weighted growth rate of labor, 
0.ttLit, can be interpreted
as the marginal effects of those factors on industry markups.  For example,  the effect of a one
percent  increase  in import penetration  on industry markup  and the  effect of a one percent
13increase in the number of domestic  firms on industry markup  would be respectively
t9gt  (N, m; Z)  _  ai  8  - a  = dM ±  2 MM in m 1 9t  ±  /iNM  in  92t
a In mt, 1 a In mit,  A930tLida In mt.,
Dgt  (N  m; Z)  a  = ON +  2 3 NN In Nt. + /NM  In m,ti.
a9 In Nt,  a9 In Nt  a90itLl,9 In Ntc~
Thus, assuming that our application of the Olley and Pakes  (1996) methodology is successful
in correcting for the endogeneity of the regression errors, and that the current value of imports
and number of firms are exogenous,  the estimated  coefficients  of the interaction  terms will
be  unbiased  estimates of the effects  of import penetration  and  domestic entry  on industry
markups.  The theoretical  model is considered  to be not rejected by the data if the estimated
values of both OiM  and OiN are negative, while  /
3 MM,  fiNN,  and /3NM  are positive.
Finally,  it  is  clear  that  even  in  the  short-run,  import  penetration  is  likely  to  be  en-
dogenous.  When there  is  a positive  productivity  shock  or  a favorable  endowment  shock,
output of the industry may increase  and reduce  the import demand of that industry, given
a fixed  consumption  pattern.  While  we  already  use  the 5th  degree  polynomial  of capital
and investment to control for industry specific productivity  shock, we have yet to control for
endowment shocks.  Following  Tlefler (1993)  and Goldberg and Maggi  (1999),  we model the
import penetration ratio as a function of factor shares in each industry/country,  in addition
to all the exogenous  variables  of the model (W):
In m,tC = 6 +  6 + ft +  Si  + 5fc factor _share,t, +  h (W)  (12)
Together,  Equations  (11)  and  (12)  form  a system  of two  equations  to  be simultaneously
estimated to determine the short-run effects of imports  and domestic competition  (number
of firms) on the  level of industry markups.
Given this framework,  we then consider  the introduction of a competition  law as a struc-
tural change to the economy,  one that is expected  to enhance competition between  domestic
14firms and reduce industry markups without specifying the channel.  To test for whether com-.
petition  law  has this effect,  we introduce a dummy variable,  Dtc,  in the markup equation,
Lt,  (N, m; Z), which equals one if there is a competition  law in the country in a given year.
In other words,  we run the following system of panel regressions:
qitc  =  Cc + Ci +  Ct +  P  (kitci  fitc)  + [P/DDIC + 16 + 13c + 1t +i  +  +NN  (ln  NtC)
+/N  In Nttc + /MM  (In mtc)2 + 8M In mttc + INM In Nstc In mitc
+g(Z)]  (Oitdit)  (13)
lnmt  +  =S+c+at  + 6t +  fCfactor _shareitc +h(W).  (14)
If the introduction  of competition  law has  an effect  on industry  markup,  we  would expect
the coefficients  of the competition  law dummy to be negative and statistically  significant.
2.4  Long-Run Equilibrium  and the Role  of Competition Laws
In the  short-run,  it is  reasonable  to assume that the number  of firms  is fixed,  and  thus  is
exogenous  to,  among  other  variables,  the industry  markups  and the  policy  environment.
However,  in the longer run, the number of firms is endogenous,  a function of the profitability
of the industry  as well  as the  ease  of entry.  We  capture  the latter  by a fixed  cost,  F  in
the  model.  Specifically,  given  a fixed  cost  of entry  and  the  prevailing  import  share,  the
equilibrium  number of firms  is determined  by the condition that the profit  obtained  by an
additional  firm is smaller than the fixed cost of entry:
N* (F, m) = arg max  {O, 7r* (N, F, m) }.
As the number of domestic firms is a discrete variable,  in equilibrium it is possible  for all of
the N* existing  firms to make  a (small)  positive profit.
15A major role of competition  law is to enhance  the contestability of markets.  Competition
laws may affect the number of domestic firms in the long run by prohibiting anti-competitive
behavior that raises entry costs.  This suggests that the existence of a competition law should,
cetems pa7ibus, lead to a higher number  of domestic firms.  To the extent that the number
of  domestic  firms  affects  industry  markup,  competition  law  would  then  indirectly affect
markups.
13
On the other hand, in the long-run  (that is, allowing  for entry and exit), there may also
be a country  'self-selection'  effect  in that the adoption  of competition  law is a function of
the overall  level of competition  prevailing in an economy.  Specifically,  if the industry  import
penetration ratio is high, or there is a large enough number of domestic firms in each industry,
the need to establish a competition  law is less,  controlling  for the stage of development  and
size  of the  countries.  Conversely,  if there  is a small  number  of domestic  firms,  it may be
politically more difficult for countries to set up a competition law as the incentive for firms to
lobby against such a law will be higher.  Overall, the impact of domestic  market structure on
the probability for countries  to adopt  a competition  law is therefore  an empirical  question.
Both entry  and  the decision  by governments  to adopt competition  laws  are endogenous  in
the long-run.
Estimating the long-run effect  of competition  law on domestic industry markup  via its
effects  on the number  of domestic  firms  thus requires  estimation  of a self-selection  model,
where domestic  entry depends  in part on the existence  of competition  law,  conditioned  on
countries  developing  a competition  law.  Specifically,  we  test the following  two-step  model
'.'We  recognize  that in practice  the enforcement  of competition  law may be  such as to raise the costs of
entry for new efficient  entrants.  This type of capture  of competition enforcement  by incumbents,  as well  as
enforcement  mistakes  that conclude  that  active price  competition  is predatory,  would  lead to an opposite
conclusion.  The empirical analysis that follows  can  be seen as providing a test  of the hypothesized  effect of
competition  law on the number of firms  in an industry.
16for the long-run equilibrium:
In Nit+lc  =  YDDtc + YAtc + f  (X)  (15)
Dt  =  {  ° if D (Nttc,  tc;  ) <O  (16)
1 if D (Rtc., i-tc; ))  > 0
where Atc  is the estimated  hazard rate of the country adopting a competition law in year t,
based on the first step selection model which specifies the decision rules of the government.
Without  controlling  for  A, the estimated  treatment  effect  of adopting  a competition  law,
_YD,  is likely to be  biased and inconsistent.  Note that the dependent  variable of the second
step regression,  Equation (15), is the one period lead value of the number of domestic  firms.
This captures the effect of a competition law on domestic entry, since in the short-run, entry-
related  fixed costs  are likely to keep the current  period  number  of firms constant.  On the
other  hand,  Equation  (16)  specifies  the decision  making  process of the government,  which
depends  on the  average  industry  characteristics,  such as the current  number  of firms and
import penetration.  Both X and w are the matrix of control variables in the two-step model.
3.  Data
Our data set comprises  28 industries in 42  developed  and developing countries for 18 years
(1981-1998).  Industries are defined at the 3 digit level of the International  Standard Indus-
trial Classification  (ISIC).  The total number  of observations  in the data set is  only 11,484,
due to missing values  for either industries,  countries or years.  Industry level production and
trade data (exports and imports) are obtained from UNIDO and the Trade and Production
Database  compiled  by Nicita  and  Olarreaga  (2002).'4  We  utilize World Bank  (2002)  for
country  level data on  variables  such as GDP and GDP per  capita.  Information  on the ex-
istence and year of adoption of competition  legislation  is drawn from national sources and
14As noted earlier,  we use export data to calculate  import  shares in total sales.
17the OECD.  Table  1 reports sample averages of the key variables  used  in the regressions by
country.
Countries and industries in our data set vary quite significantly.  On average,  each indus-
try in each  country has some  1,500 firms, ranging  from less than 50 firms on average  in each
industry in Panama to more than 15,000  firms on average in a Japanese  industry.  The size
of industries also varies  substantially  across countries - with average  sales of US$70 million,
Cyprus has  the smallest  average  industry size,  while  at  nearly US$90  billion,  industries  in
the U.S.  are the largest.
Import competition is weakest in Japan, where the ratio of imports to domestic  produc-
tion for a typical industry  is only  6 percent,  compared  to 80  percent  for a typical industry
in Hong Kong.  On average,  the ratio of imports to domestic output is around  18 percent in
the sample.  In terms of the year in which competition law was first passed, Canada and U.S.
have long-standing  enforcement  dating back  to the turn of last century,  while  Egypt, Hong
Kong and  Singapore  have yet to adopt  any  form of competition  law.  Nineteen  countries in
the data set had a competition  law prior to  1981.  A number  of developing  and transitional
economies  subsequently  adopted  competition  laws during the sample  period.
'rable  1 also  presents  data  on  GDP  and  GDP  per capita  for the  countries  in the data
set.  Here  again there is substantial  variation.  The largest  country in the sample,  the U.S.,
is  more than  1000  times  larger  than Jordan,  the smallest  country  in the  sample.  On the
other hand, the richest country in the sample  is Japan,  with a  per capita  GDP more than
100 times greater than the poorest countries  (India and Kenya).
Table  2  provides sample  averages  of the main variables  used  by industry.  The  food  in-
dustry has the largest  average number  of firms, with an average of more than 5200 firms  in
each  country.  On the other hand,  with an  average  of only  33 firms,  the petroleum refining
18industry is the most concentrated.  The largest industry in the sample is the transport  equip-
ment industry,  with average sales  of more than US$20  billion.  The pottery  and earthware
industry lies at the other  end of the spectrum with average sales of only US$550  million per
year.  Firms in the petroleum industry on average are the largest  in size - the typical firm has
average  sales  of US$275  million  a year.  On the other hand,  the footloose  apparel  industry
has the smallest average firm size - only about  US$1  million on average.
In terms of total volume of imports  (trade),  machinery and transport  equipment indus-
tries rank  first.  However,  judging  by the ratio  of imports  to domestic  production,  leather
products, scientific instruments and miscellaneous manufactures  face the most intense import
competition.  With an import ratio of only 4 percent,  the printing  and publishing  industry
faces the least import competition.
Given  the  heterogeneity  of the  countries  and  industries  in the data  set,  it  is  clearly
important to control for country and industry specific effects in the estimation of the industry
markup function.  We also  include year  specific  effects to control for any general  movement
of international prices  and development trends.
4.  Results
Table 3 presents the regression results for the short-run case, where the number of domestic
firms  is  assumed  to be fixed.  The dependent  variable  is  the  growth rate of real  industry
value  added relative to the capital stock,  4it,. The top part of Table 3 presents the estimated
semi-translog  function,  itc (estc, Nitc,)mitc),  as defined  in Equation  (10) .
Column  (1)  shows  the baseline  ordinary  least squares  regression  using  the full  sample,
without  a competition  law dummy  variable.  The  estimated  first order  effect of imports  on
industry markup is negative and significant; the same holds for the estimated coefficient  on
19domestic sales.  The second order effects of these variables  do not seem to matter in the full
sample.  On the other hand,  we do not  find the effect  of the number of domestic firms  on
industry markups to be significant.  This is not surprising,  as in the full sample the average
number of firms per industry is around 1,500.  Thus, an additional firm in an industry should
not have any significant  effect.  As shown in Figure 1 and Bresnahan and Reiss  (1991), entry
by new firns should have the greatest  effects  on competition  when  the  existing  market  is
highly concentrated.  We will come back to this point  later.
The lower part of Table  3 reports the variables that pertain to the industry production
function,  including  a-5th order polynomial  of capital and investment  to control of industry
productivity growth and a full set of industry,  year and country fixed effects.  The estimated
coefficients  are not reported due to space limitations,  but are available upon request.
The competition law dummy variable representing the structural change due to the adop-
tion of a competition law is introduced  in Column  (2).  Not only is the dummy variable not
significant,  it is clear that  adding the  competition  dummy  does not change  the previous
result.  In other words,  we do not observe a significant  effect of the competition  law dummy
variable on industry markups in the full sample - the primary policy-determined  variable is
foreign competition.
Given that the impact of both foreign and domestic competition on markups is most likely
to be important  in concentrated markets, the next two columns of Table 3 report the results
of a three-stage  least squares  regression  for a subset  of industries with high concentration,
specifically,  those with  no more than  30  domestic  firms.  Both the production  and import
penetration  functions are simultaneously  estimated.  Column  (3)  reports the results of the
production function  estimation,  and Column  (3')  reports  those  for the import  penetration
function.
20Column (3) indicates that for this sub-sample  both imports and the number of domestic
firms have a statistically significant effect in reducing industry markups.  In fact, the marginal
effect of a 10 percent increase in the import share in domestic sales is quantitatively equivalent
to the  marginal  effect  of an  additional  domestic  entrant  when  there  are  only  9  firms  in
the market.  In  other words,  the regression  results suggest that both foreign  and domestic
competition  are  important  in reducing  domestic  market  power.  Domestic  sales  and labor
costs  are  also significant  determinants  of industry  markups - a larger  domestic  market  or
lower cost of production are associated with higher industry markups.
Column (3') reveals that it is important to control for the endogeneity of import penetra-
tion (Equation  (14)  above).  Factors that are negatively  correlated  with import penetration
include the number of domestic firms and their sales, and the size of the overall economy.  The
effects of domestic endowments, proxied by the industry factor shares are also included in the
regression,  but coefficient  estimates are not reported in the Table due to space  limitations.
The effects  of adding the competition law dummy to the system of equations are reported
in column (4).  Once again, we find that after controlling for the effects of domestic and foreign
competition,  the direct  effect  of competition  law is not statistically significant,  although it
has the right sign, even if the analysis  is restricted  to more concentrated  industries with less
than 30 firms.
Table  4  presents results for the long-run  equilibrium  case,  where both competition law
and the entry and exit of domestic firms are endogenous.  The number of domestic  firms  in
an industry  is  responsive  to,  among other  factors, the  (fixed)  cost  of entry,  which  in turn
is  affected  by the competition  law of the countries.  On the other hand,  the government's
decision  to  adopt  a competition  law may  depend  on  the average  level  of competition  in
domestic industries, as well as the stage of development of the economy (proxied by GDP and
21GDP per capita).  This suggests that the  'treatment effect'  of competition law on domestic
competition could be underestimated  if we  do not  control for the self-selection  bias.1 5
T'o correct for the endogeneity of competition law, we use a two-step procedure developed
by Heckman  (1979).  Specifically,  assume that  for any period,  a country's decision to adopt
or abandon  a competition  law  depends  on the  perceived  level  of industry  markups,  which
are affected by the current level of imports, total domestic output, and total number of firms
in the industry.  We then first estimate  a selection model by regressing  the competition  law
dummy  on  average industry  imports,  domestic sales,  and the number  of firms,  controlling
for level  of GDP  and GDP per capita of the countries  (Equation  (16)  above).  We  use the
predict  probability  to  construct  the  hazard  rate,  Atc,  which  wil  then  be  included  in  our
entry  regression  (Equation  (15)).  We  expect  the  estimated  hazard  rate to  be negatively
correlated with domestic entry,  since the larger the number of domestic  firms, the less likely
the government  would  need  to adopt  a competition  law to  promote  entry.  Once  the  self-
selection bias is controlled for by the estimated hazard  rate,  we expect the competition  law
dummy variable to have a positive effect in promoting entry (that is, the future (t+1) number
of firms in each industry).
Table  4  presents  the results  of the two-step  selection  model,  where Column  (1)  shows
the estimated  effects  of competition  law and the self-selection  bias  on domestic  entry,  and
Column (2) shows the estimated decision rule of governments  in adopting competition  laws.
The regression results suggest  self-selection  bias is indeed important.  Correcting for this
bias, industries operating under a competition law tend to have a larger  number of domestic
I  ISpecifically,  while some countries  may choose to pass and keep a competition law as a response to current
high industry markups,  others  may not need such a law given low industry  markups.  This  would lead to  a
contemporaneous  positive correlation  between  industry markup  and the status of the competition law.  Not
controlling for  such a self-selection  bias will  lead to under-estimation  of the effectiveness  of competition law
in reducing industry markups.  In other words,  given that we expect the treatment effect of competition law
on industry markup to be negative,  the least squares estimate would have an upward  bias; if the bias is large
enough it could result in a positive estimate.
22firms  - on average  7.2  percent  more.  Moreover,  countries'  decisions to adopt  competition
laws do appear  to be associated with variables that reflect  the average  level  of competition
in industries.  For example,  countries that have a higher level of import penetration  are less
likely to adopt competition  laws, while countries that have  a higher level  of domestic  sales
in a typical industry are more likely to adopt competition laws.
The results in Tables 3 and 4 together suggest that while competition law may not have a
direct effect on industry markups,  even in more concentrated  markets, it may affect industry
markups  in the long run via its effects on domestic entry and thus the long run equilibrium
number of domestic  firms.
5.  Conclusion
For competition  law  to be  a priority,  it  must  yield a higher  pay-off in  terms  of fostering
competition than other policy options.  The analysis in this paper suggests that dealing with
trade  barriers  and  govermnent  regulation  that restrict  domestic  competition  by  impeding
entry and exit by firms will generate a higher rate of return than the adoption of a competition
law.  Indeed,  the regression results obtained here suggest that the direct effect of competition
law  on industry markup is not significant,  even  if the analysis  is limited to the sub-sample
of  more  concentrated  industries.  However,  once  account  is  taken  of  the  endogeneity  of
competition law adoption, we find that competition laws have an effect on entry by domestic
firms, which may  indirectly  affect the long run level  of industry competition  (markups).'6
Any  assessment  of whether  and how to adopt  antitrust disciplines  must of course  con-
sider factors  that have  been  ignored  in this paper.  One  such factor  relates  to the costs  of
'6Some  authors  have  found  that  competition  policy  paradoxically  reduces  the number  of  firms-see  e.g.,
Bittlingmayer  (1985)-because  prohibitions on price fixing and similar  arrangements  among firms encourage
mergers.  Our  cross-country  results  suggest  that while  such  incentives  may exist  the  overall  effect  is  the
opposite.
23enforcement.  Import liberalization not only has a more powerful and direct effect on compe-
tition, it also is a lower cost policy alternative,  especially in the long run given no recurrent
administrative  enforcement  and  compliance  costs.  Another  factor  not  considered  here are
possible international  externalities  associated with the enforcement  (or non-enforcement)  of
antitrust by foreign countries.  It must  also be recognized  that the analysis has been limited
to industries  producing  tradable  goods.  Many products  are non-tradable  (e.g.,  many  ser-
vices).  Even if tradable,  competition may be limited to local  markets for other reasons  (e.g.,
transport  costs).  Certain  products  may be  produced  by  (natural)  monopolies  or by  firms
where 'unnatural'  (government-made)  barriers to entry restrict contestability.  In determin-
ing whether  to make the adoption and enforcement  of competition law a domestic priority,
a wider  focus  will  be required.  However,  it  should  also  be recognized  that in many  cases
competition law may not be the appropriate instrument  to deal with such issues either.  For
example,  in the case of services  it may well be the case that the impact  of government  poli-
cies that restrict competition in services dominate  (or are a major element allowing)  private
restrictive business practices.
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26Table  1:  Data at a Glance by Country,  1981-1998
Numbers of  Value in Million of US$  US$  Comp. Law  Growth Rates (%) of
Domestic
Country  Sample'  Firms  Imports  Production  GDP  GDPPC  Passed in  Y/K  L/K  K  I
Australia  138  1008  742  2830  248000  16146  1906  -0.34  -1.28  0.41  -1.09
Austria  392  313  1120  2380  195300  25362  1951  -1.88  -2.67  3.19  -0.02
Bulgaria  60  577  86.9  286  12570  1485  1991  -47.46  -19.31  44.69  57.70
Canada  276  1325  2660  8260  468100  17841  1889  -2.93  -2.50  4.56  2.70
Chile  376  55  265  839  42260  3180  1959  -1.02  -1.53  6.91  6.20
Colombia  402  271  213  798  69710  2050  1959  -0.59  -0.63  3.92  -3.31
Cyprus  335  278  74.2  70  6049  8978  1989  -4.01  -2.20  6.56  -2.46
Denrark  297  381  707  1300  150000  29267  1937  -0.31  -0.61  2.22  3.08
Egypt  366  268  268  786  45400  907  No Law  4.12  -0.34  3.85  5.13
Finland  454  337  577  2020  116500  23419  1958  -0.96  -1.93  1.69  1.80
Greece  336  294  407  797  102200  10210  1977  1.35  -0.69  -0.08  -3.69
Hong Kong  350  2042  6660  1610  106700  18265  No Law  -8.99  -6.23  4.58  -10.30
Hungary  351  199  27.5  876  48150  4588  1990  -3.23  -2.23  0.19  -3.38
India  462  3846  553  4410  271600  320  1969  -5.36  -4.53  12.66  8.78
Indonesia  365  570  626  1430  129600  737  1999  -6.28  -3.47  23.83  15.18
Ireland  257  194  412  801  40790  11605  1991  -2.05  -2.62  2.43  -0.37
Italy  330  1266  3820  13300  959700  16919  1990  -4.86  -3.37  5.34  1.03
Japan  471  15044  4830  73500  4452000  36206  1947  -1.37  -1.27  2.85  2.90
Jordan  325  424  99.7  109  5339  1603  2000  1.19  -0.51  6.29  -7.59
Kenya  91  198  97.7  480  9283  333  1988  41.42  -19.26  43.90  16.96
Korea  494  2397  1930  8490  333900  7704  1980  -1.89  -2.81  9.96  8.27
Mexico  252  111  679  1870  246900  3180  1992  -4.06  -1.95  8.35  1.01
Morocco  209  282  217  586  34130  1317  1999  0.29  -0.56  4.50  3.10
Netherlands  208  327  3420  5150  340700  22943  1957  -1.59  -2.96  3.99  4.59
New Zealand  80  843  385  974  51500  15370  1986  -5.14  -3.03  0.36  -14.09
Norway  433  283  761  1530  122200  28823  1926  2.34  -1.11  -0.01  -1.14
Pakistan  82  163  183  421  39590  402  1970  -25.27  -8.38  36.04  -8.25
Panama  146  45  51.4  89.2  6784  2733  1996  -6.91  -4.28  7.36  9.28
Peru  295  522  82.4  498  48420  2394  1991  -2.01  0.26  -1.63  -19.62
Poland  190  216  318  1870  105900  2800  1990  -25.60  -5.65  12.15  -1.09
Portugal  241  488  322  725  77670  7799  1983  -5.07  -2.52  4.26  0.88
Romania  17  656  145  716  30250  1320  1991  -64.40  -18.42  43.11  18.83
Singapore  406  156  2120  1430  54550  19848  No Law  -3.31  -3.00  6.67  5.01
Spain  386  5380  1800  6900  477000  12340  1963  -6.62  -3.14  6.12  3.96
Sri Lanka  253  294  93.9  99.9  10030  593  1987  -2.01  -2.34  13.07  -0.17
Sweden  168  383  953  2530  197400  23641  1953  0.32  -1.30  0.68  0.82
Thailand  77  537  1430  3570  128900  2258  1979  0.50  -5.42  38.78  -13.69
Turkey  196  274  608  2610  148500  2607  1994  -22.39  -6.75  30.18  6.09
United Kingdom  417  5026  5740  16900  969600  16881  1948  -1.79  -2.13  0.98  0.62
United States  84  13952  12400  88100  5716000  23456  1890  2.14  -0.68  1.16  -0.15
Venezuela  416  360  303  1030  66710  3508  1991  -1.59  -1.01  3.98  -1.34
Average  11484  1502  1419  6414  406973  10520  1970  -7.33  -3.76  10.00  2.25
Notes:  ' Denotes the total number of observations  for each country.
Unless otherwise stated all numbers denote simple averages across industries and years for each county.
27Table  2:  Data at a Glance  by Industry,  1981-1998
ISIC  Numbers of  Value in  Million of US$  Growth Rates (%)  of
I  ~~~~~~Domestic
Industry  Descrnption  Samplel  Firms  Imports  Production  Y/K  L/K  K  I
311  Food  455  5244  2660  18800  -1.39  -1.53  6.16  2.61
313  Beverages  417  508  307  3700  -3.24  -1.67  6.86  0.87
314  Tobacco  402  383  222  1850  -2.47  -1.67  7.47  1.29
321  Textiles  455  3414  1970  6620  -3.32  -2.30  2.98  -1.85
322  Apparel  442  2702  1150  3030  -3.32  -2.81  7.01  2.36
323  Leatherproducts  405  441  503  702  -3.53  -2.41  3.28  -2.18
324  Footwear  422  426  318  798  -5.73  -3.93  5.70  -2.61
331  Wood products  426  2826  696  3180  -3.22  -1.99  4.43  -1.93
332  Fumiture  . 427  1655  254  1980  -3.17  -2.38  6.53  1.99
341  Paper and products  453  892  974  5480  4.17  -2.52  6.66  -0.28
342  Pnnting and publishing  450  3337  249  6650  4.49  -3.39  9.07  5.37
351  Industrialchemicals  394  414  2960  8580  -1.16  -1.47  5.20  0.05
352  Otherchemicals  405  829  1340  7560  -3.05  -2.36  8.63  4.62
353  Petroleumrefinenes  311  33  1400  9020  -6.31  -2.35  7.88  -1.31
354  Petroleumandcoalproducts  *238  174  112  1090  -5.11  -2.45  8.26  2.26
355  Rubberproducts  435  412  308  1890  4.02  -2.54  5.13  2.29
356  Plasticproducts  437  1763  774  5050  4.02  -2.30  9.34  5.31
361  Potteryandearthenware  356  346  82.4  550  -5.28  -3.98  6.91  -1.20
362  Glass and products  376  233  223  1240  -5.95  -3.71  8.55  0.74
369  Non-metallicminmralproducts  411  1935  241  4650  -3.77  -2.21  7.20  2.63
371  Ironandsteel  374  764  1360  9870  -3.51  -2.59  3.55  -2.02
372  Non-ferrous  metals  371  425  1280  3940  -3.14  -2.13  5.43  2.03
381-  Fabricated metal  products  451  4757  1380  9280  -3.68  -2.46  6.42  1.02
382  Machineryexceptelectncal  418  4903  5640  19100  -1.97  -2.39  7.51  1.08
383  Electricalmachmery  451  2415  5340  18500  -3.81  -2.75  7.20  3.59
384  Transportequipment  451  1374  4660  20500  -3.25  -3.53  6.82  3.27
385  Scientificequipment  411  707  1650  2820  -3.96  -3.00  8.90  3.02
390  Othermanufacturedproducts  440  1530  1220  2100  -5.33  -3.31  7.98  2.28
Notes:  Denotes the  total number of observations in each industry.
Unless otherwise stated all numbers denote simple averages across countries  and years of each industry
28Table  3:  Regression  Results
OLS  OLS  3SLS  3SLS
Explanatory Variables (in log)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (3')  (4)  (4')
Competition law  0.420  -0.146
(0.244)  (0.201)
Imports  -0.223°°  -0.232**  -0.139°°  -0.136°°
(0.107)  (0.107)  (0064)  (0.064)
Imports squared  -0.002  -0.002
(0.009)  (0.009)
Firms  0.372  0 370  -0.138***  -0.544***  -0 1400  .(0 543000
(0.213)  (0213)  (0052)  (0.149)  (0.052)  (0.149)
Firms squared  -0.025  -0.025  0 006***  0.159°°°  0.0060**  0.159 °°°
(0.018)  (0.018)  (0002)  (0.032)  (0.002)  (0.032)
Firms *  Imports  0.030  0.032
(0.018)  (0.018)
Sales  -1.056°*  -1.133**  2 304***  -2 692***  2 320***  -2.692*0*
(0.486)  (0.482)  (0.657)  (0.341)  (0.657)  (0.341)
Sales squared  0.024  00260*  -0.0760**  0.051P  *  0.077***  0051 **
(0.013)  (0.013)  (0.018)  (0010)  (0.018)  (0.010)
Labor cost  -0.258  -0 597  -3  3750°¢  0 427  -3.458  0 428
(0.959)  (0.983)  (0.999)  (0.418)  (1.006)  (0.418)
Labor cost squared  0.015  0.034  0.199°°°  -0.046°  0 2050**  -0.046°
(0 058)  (0.060)  (0.056)  (0.025)  (0.057)  (0.025)
GDP  3 054**  3.790**  -2 939*0*  -2.940°°°
(I  051)  (1.496)  (0.610)  (0.610)
GDPPC  -1.298  -I  878  4.142°°°  4.142°°°
(I  504)  (1.502)  (0.552)  (0.552)
Constant  -54.393*s  -66.330°°  -1.126  71  319*0*  -0.950  71.342°0°
(27.209)  (26.882)  (7.185)  (12.344)  (7.188)  (12.344)
Factor shares  Yes  Yes
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Country Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Polynomial  (K,l)  5th order  5th order  5th order  5th order
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Country Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Sample Size  10447  10447  1488  1488  1488  1488
R-squares  0.4219  0.4222  0.3499  0.9601  0.3501  0.9601
notes:  Column (I)  and (2) are performed using the full sample.
Column (3) and (4) only use data on the highly concentrated markets (finns<="30).
Both sets of 3SLS estimating a system of 2 equations on industry markups and import penetration.
Column (31) and (4') report results of the import penetration regression where factor shares are used as controls
for endowments  and productivity differences.
29Table 4:  Selection Models
Dependent Variable: Firns in next period  Dependent Variable:  Competition Law
(1)  (2)
Competition law  0.072**  Average imports  -1.185***
(0 017)  (0.055)
Lambda (hazard  rate)  -0.066***  Average imports squared  -0.128***
(0.009)  (0.008)
Imports  -0.002  Average firms  -0.201
(0.002)  (0.488)
Sales  0.023***  Average firms squared  -0.067
(0.005)  (0.047)
Labor cost  -0.025**  Average  lagged firms  4.392***
(0.010)  (0.536)
GDP  -0.525***  Average lagged firms squared  -0-334***
(0.074)  (0.052)
GDPPC  0.311***  Average sales  2.814**
(0.078)  (1.260)
Firms  0.891***  Average sales squared  -0.096***
(0.010)  (0.031)
Lag firms  0.066***  Competition agencyl  4.317***
(0.010)  (0.132)
Year  0.015***  GDP  -4.349**
(0.002)  (1.743)




GDPPC squared  0.576***
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  (0.023)
Year Fixed Effects  Yes
Country Fixed Effects  Yes  Year  0.127***
Sample Size  8277  (0.008)
Notes: Heckman two step selection model is performed.
Column (2) reports the competition  law selection model  and Column (1) reports
the domestic entry model, controlling for selection bias (lambda) estimated from Column (2
lDummy variable which equals  one if the country has a competition agency in that year.
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